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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-EXCLUSIVE-REMEDY PRO-
VISION OF FOREIGN WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION LAW-Plaintiff, a resident 
of Missouri, entered into an employment contract there with a Missouri 
painting company. He was injured while working in Arkansas on a job 
his empioyer had subcontracted from the defendant, a Louisiana contractor. 
The Missouri employer's insurer voluntarily began weekly payments to the 
plaintiff pursuant to the Missouri workmen's compensation law, although 
there had been no formal proceeding or award. Payments under the 
Missouri act were exclusive of all other rights and remedies.1 After re-
ceiving thirty-four payments, the plaintiff sued the defendant for negli-
gence in the Arkansas courts.2 The defendant had the case removed to 
the federal district court, where judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.3 
The court of appeals reversed.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court, held, reversed, three justices dissenting. Arkansas' interests in the 
case were substantial in light of possible problems following in the wake 
of the injury .. Therefore, her courts were not bound by the full faith and 
credit clause to subserve these interests to those of Missouri, despite the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Missouri law. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 
U.S. 408, 75 S.Ct. 804 (1955). 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the full faith 
and credit clause embodies a policy which looks toward a maximum en-
forcement in each state of the rights and obligations created by statutes 
of sister states.5 It has been held, for example, that a state may refuse to 
entertain an action based on ·a foreign law which is antagonistic to its public 
policy only if the Court feels that the policy is not outweighed by the 
"strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause."6 
In the area of workmen's compensation statutes, however, the Court's 
l This assertion is based upon the majority opinion's interpretation of Missouri law. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §287.120; Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W. (2d) 153 (1938). 
The dissent believed that Missouri courts might have found that the general contractor 
was not a Missouri employer and so not subject to the· Missouri act. This would mean 
that the Missouri courts would have permitted a common law action against the defend-
ant, and since there is no constitutional obligation to give full faith and credit to a com-
pensation statute of another state if the foreign state's courts have not interpreted their 
statute as being exclusive of other remedies outside the state [Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler 
and Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439, 53 S.Ct. 663 (1933)], no constitutional issue was raised by the 
case. 
2 Arkansas workmen's compensation provisions, while providing the exclusive remedy 
of the employee against his employer [Ark. Stat. (1947) §81-1304], are not exclusive 
against a third party. Id., §81-1340. The Arkansas court has determined that a prime 
contractor is such a third party and can be sued at common law for negligence by an 
injured worker. Baldwin Co. v. Maner, (Ark. 1954) 273 S.W. (2d) 28; Anderson v. Sander-
son &: Porter, (8th Cir. 1945) 146 F. (2d) 58. 
3 116 F. Supp. 491 (1953). 
4 216 F. (2d) 808 •(1954). The court considered Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 
320 U.S. 430, 64 S.Ct. 208 (1943), to be controlling. See note 17 infra. 
5 See 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 267 (1952). 
6 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 at 612, 71 S.Ct. 980 (1951). See also First Nat. Bank 
of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 72 S.Ct. 421 (1952). 
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application of this clause has been somewhat different. 7 In Bradford 
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper8 the Court held that the forum, New Hamp-
shire, must give effect to a defense based upon the exclusive-remedy pro-
vision of the workmen's compensation act of Vermont, the state of the 
contract, residence, and regular employment,9 despite the fact that the 
injury and death occurred in New Hampshire. The Court called the in-
terest of the forum "casual,"10 especially since there was no showing that 
the Vermont law was obnoxious to her public policy. In a later case such a 
showing was made, and the Court declared that the forum need not give 
effect to foreign law because the forum had an equally valid "govern-
mental interest" fo granting relief.11 In Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Commission12 this rationale was applied to a Clapper 
type of case: California, as forum, was only the place of the injury while 
Massachusetts was the place of all other employer-employee relationships. 
The Court weighed the governmental interests13 in favor of California, 
pointing first to the fact that California had expressly declared the en-
forcement of the foreign law to be obnoxious to her public policy and, 
secondly, to her interest in the legal consequences of the injury. In applying 
this balance-of-interest test in the principal case, the Court upholds the 
forum's refusal of a defense based upon a foreign exclusive-remedy statute, 
when the forum's only relations to the parties are that it was the place of 
the injury and that there was the mere possibility of other legal problems 
within the state growing out of the injury.14 It has also been held that 
7 "A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard 
to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict 
arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot 
be in its own." Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U.S. 532 at 547, 
55 S.CL 518 (1935). 
8 286 U.S. 145, 52 S.CL 571 (1932). 
9 Place of contract, residence, and place of regular employment are among the em-
ployer-employee relationships which are used to determine whether or not a state will 
give its local workmen's compensation law extraterritorial effect. See 57 HARv. L. R.Ev. 
m~~ . 
10 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 at 162, 52 S.CL 571 (1932). 
llAlaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm., note 7 supra, at 547. 
12 306 U.S. 493, 59 S.Ct. 629 (1939). 
13 The development of this doctrine is fully covered in Fxeund, "Chief Justice Stone 
and the Conflict of Laws," 59 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1210 (1946). 
14 While the dissent based its decision on different grounds (see note 1 supra), it 
believed that the majority opinion had impliedly overruled Bradford Electric Light Co. 
v. Clapper, note 10 supra, and had failed to consider the new provision of 28 U.S.C. 
(1952) §1738, which expressly requires that statutes be given full faith and credit. Since 
the employee was never actually treated in Arkansas, the principal case has, at least, 
reduced the Clapper decision to its particular facts. If the employee is killed in the state 
of the forum and that is the forum's only connection to the employer-employee relation-
ship, then the forum's interest is "casual" and full faith and credit must be accorded the 
statutes of states with greater interests. But if the employee is only injured, then the 
mere possibility of problems arising within that state as a result of the injury is enough 
of an interest to allow the forum to disregard the statutes of other states. 
Because the Clapper case was not expressly overruled, it is also important to note 
that there was no express showing by Arkansas that enforcement of the Missouri statute 
would be obnoxious to her public policy. Since the action in Arkansas was in common 
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even if the forum is not the place of the injury, it may award an exclusive 
remedy based upon its interest in (I) preventing the injured party from 
becoming a public charge15 or (2) providing adequate workmen's compen-
sation measures for its residents.16 I£ a state is involved in the employer-
employee relationship at all, it is now difficult to think of an interest which 
is not sufficient to allow it to apply its own law and ignore those of sister 
states.17 
The principal case further differentiates between an attempt by a state 
to exclude an action based upon another state's statutes and an attempt 
to give its own remedy in an action in which it is interested. The interest 
of a state in excluding a cause of action must be very great to justify a 
refusal to entertain that action if it is based upon a sister state's statutes.18 
On the other hand, a relatively slight connection to an incident may be 
enough of an interest to permit a state to apply its own statutes or common 
law and to justify refusing a defense based upon a foreign statute. An 
evaluation of relative interests is a far from satisfactory solution to full 
faith and credit problems, because there are no real standards by which the 
conflicting and social and economic interests may be measured.19 One can 
only .watch the Court's decisions as to what constitutes a superior state 
interest and try to discern some pattern or design into which the cases 
seem to fit. 
Morton A. Polster, S.Ed. 
law and not based upon a similarly exclusive statutory provision, it must be assumed that 
the court was either (I) limiting Clapper as stated above, (2) inferring by some means 
that the enforcement of the Missouri law was obnoxious to Arkansas' public policy, or 
(3) eliminating the need for a showing of obnoxiousness. 
15 Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm., note 7 supra. 
16 Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 67 S.Ct. 801 (1947). 
17 This statement should be considered along with the possibilities of multiple 
recovery under the compensation acts of more than one state. The rule of Magnolia 
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, note 4 supra, that a recovery by a final award in one state pre-
cludes any further recovery under the workmen's compensation laws of other states, was 
limited by Industrial Comm. of Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 67 S.Ct. 886 (1947), to 
cases where the compensating state had interpreted the payment made to be exclusive 
of all other compensation anywhere. In the principal case, the entire Court agreed that 
the Magnolia Petroleum case did not apply because there had been no "final award" 
under the Missouri act. This further restricts the Magnolia Petroleum rule and increases 
the possibility of multiple recoveries even where payments are deemed exclusive. 
18 Hughes v. Fetter, note 6 supra. 
19 Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," 45 CoL. 
L. REv. I (1945). 
